## Notes from 09 December 2025 [[2025-12-08|← Previous note]] ┃ [[2025-12-10|Next note →]] [Acteurs Publics](https://acteurspublics.fr/articles/reforme-de-letat-la-mission-etat-efficace-le-mysterieux-commando-qui-ne-marche-plus-que-sur-une-jambe/) reported today that the _"Mission État Efficace"_ in France is already running into trouble—Denis Morin has left, leaving the initiative with only one of its two original leaders. Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu launched the _Mission État Efficace_ (Effective State Mission) on [September 19](https://www.info.gouv.fr/communique/creation-de-la-mission-etat-efficace-et-adoption-par-le-premier-ministre-de-ses-premieres-propositions), just ten days after taking office. The mission was assigned to two retired senior officials: Pierre-Mathieu Duhamel (_inspecteur général des finances_, Budget Director 2002-2006 under PM Raffarin and President Chirac) and Denis Morin (president of chamber at the _Cour des comptes_, Budget Director 2013-2017 under PMs Ayrault/Valls and President Hollande). The bipartisan pairing was intentional—one from the right, one from the left, one IGF, one _Cour des comptes_. The mission is attached directly to Matignon (the Prime Minister's office) and operates from the former offices of the Notre-Dame reconstruction mission. Two objectives were defined: first, to make the administrative organization more legible and efficient by merging, consolidating, or eliminating redundant structures; second, to strengthen performance management in ministries and state operators, with explicit emphasis on holding public managers accountable for results. The first concrete outputs were immediate: suppression of several interministerial delegations (forestry and wood, agricultural water policy, business restructuring, major sporting events, the SNU coordination), plus a freeze on new government communications spending through year-end and a target of 20-40% cuts to state communications budgets for 2026. But Morin's departure—reportedly due to disagreements, though both parties cite "personal reasons"—suggests the mission may be struggling internally. This got me thinking about comparative institutional design for government efficiency initiatives. Everyone seems to want their own DOGE now, but what actually works? ### Models worth comparing **[[Sturzenegger’s reforms|Ministerio de Desregulación y Transformación del Estado]] (Argentina, 2024-present):** Milei created this ministry in July 2024 under [Federico Sturzenegger](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federico_Sturzenegger). Full ministerial status with [27 defined competencies](https://www.argentina.gob.ar/desregulacion) covering deregulation, state reform, civil service policy, and regulatory simplification. Permanent structure, not time-limited. Represents the maximalist end of the spectrum—a dedicated ministry for state shrinkage. According to Milei, Elon Musk called Sturzenegger to discuss using this as a model for DOGE. - Similar models around the world dedicate a ministry specifically to red tape issues, such as the [Ministry of Red Tape Reduction](https://www.ontario.ca/page/ministry-red-tape-reduction) in Ontario (Canada) or the [Ministry for Regulation](https://www.beehive.govt.nz/portfolio/regulation) in New Zealand. **Fiscal oversight bodies (Puerto Rico & Jamaica):** Some jurisdictions have established independent bodies focused less on efficiency per se and more on fiscal discipline - but these offer instructive contrasts in institutional design. - Puerto Rico operates under the **[Financial Oversight and Management Board (FOMB)](https://oversightboard.pr.gov/)**—often called _"La Junta"_—a federally appointed entity created by the U.S. Congress under the [2016 PROMESA Act](https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/2328). The Board holds legal authority to override local elected officials and enforce debt restructuring from the top down—an externally imposed mechanism with binding power but limited democratic legitimacy. - Jamaica's **[Economic Programme Oversight Committee (EPOC)](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/3_Arslanalp-et-al_unembargoed.pdf)** offers a different model: a homegrown "watchdog" born from domestic consensus during the country's IMF-backed fiscal adjustment program in 2013. Comprised of private sector and civil society leaders, EPOC lacks executive power but enforces discipline through transparency—providing independent, real-time monitoring of fiscal targets and publishing regular public reports that hold the government accountable. - The contrast is instructive: external imposition vs. domestic buy-in, binding authority vs. reputational pressure. **[Office for Value for Money](https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/the-office-for-value-for-money)(UK, 2024-2025):** Rachel Reeves established this as a temporary Treasury unit with an independent chair ([David Goldstone](https://www.gov.uk/government/people/david-goldstone)). One-year mandate, 20 staff, focused on the 2025 Spending Review and framework reforms. Outputs included rolling 1% efficiency targets, thematic value-for-money reviews, streamlined delegated authority limits, and 10-year efficiency projections. The Institute for Government [assessed it as a success](https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/comment/office-value-money), explicitly contrasting it with "a crude, DOGE-like approach to cuts." - Design features: time-limited (preventing bureaucratic entrenchment), hybrid status (internal access + independent voice), defined scope (system reforms, not day-to-day firefighting), strong political backing, published evaluation. **[[Rayner Scrutinies]] (UK, 1979-1980s):** Margaret Thatcher established the Efficiency Unit just four days after taking office, led by Derek Rayner. The approach relied on "scrutinies"—rapid reviews of specific government functions conducted by internal officials under the Unit's guidance. By 1982, 130 scrutinies had identified £170 million in savings and led to 16,000 annual job cuts. By 1986, 300 scrutinies had identified £600 million in _potential_ savings—though the [National Audit Office found actual realized savings were much lower](https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20220801195818mp_/https://www.nao.org.uk/pubsarchive/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2018/11/The-Rayner-Scrutiny-Programmes-1979-to-1983.pdf) (confirming only £51m realized out of £215m identified in early reviews). - Design features: small central unit, borrowed private-sector leadership, action through departments rather than imposed from above, explicit culture-change goal ("managing efficiently is of equal merit to thinking through policies"). **[[Sunset Clauses|Texas Sunset Advisory Commission]] (Texas, 1977-present):** Reviews every state agency on a [12-year cycle](https://www.sunset.texas.gov/how-sunset-works) with automatic abolition unless the legislature acts. Has abolished 95 agencies (42 completely, 53 consolidated). Estimated [$1 billion fiscal impact](https://www.sunset.texas.gov/about-us), ~$16 return per dollar spent. Bipartisan 12-member commission (5 senators, 5 representatives, 2 public members). The automatic abolition trigger is the key forcing function—agencies must justify their continued existence. **Little Hoover Commission (California, 1962-present):** Permanent independent agency for efficiency and effectiveness reviews, formally known as the [Milton Marks "Little Hoover" Commission on California State Government Organization and Economy](https://lhc.ca.gov/). Unlike Texas Sunset, there is no automatic abolition mechanism - its purely advisory. More research-oriented, less forcing function. 13 bipartisan members. Named after the federal [Hoover Commissions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hoover_Commission) that operated under Presidents Truman and Eisenhower. **Administrative Conference of the United States (US federal government, 1964-1995, 2010-present):** Up to [101 members](https://www.acus.gov/about-acus) from government, academia, and private sector. Focuses on administrative procedure improvements (rulemaking, adjudication, regulatory processes) rather than cutting government. Not primarily about efficiency in the spending sense, but about making the machinery work better. Defunded by Congress in 1995, then reauthorized in 2004 and reestablished in 2010. **National Performance Review / [Reinventing Government](https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/WH/EOP/OVP/initiatives/reinventing_government.html) (US federal government, 1993-2001):** Clinton assigned Vice President Gore to lead a [six-month review](https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/papers/bkgrd/brief.html) that produced 384 recommendations. Staffed by ~250 career civil servants. The initial report, _[From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less](https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/nprrpt/annrpt/redtpe93/index.html)_, promised $108 billion in savings and led to the [[Government Performance and Results Modernization Act (GPRAMA)|GPRA]] framework. Key principles: put customers first, cut red tape, empower employees, cut back to basics. By 2001, the initiative claimed workforce reduction of 426,200 (though some dispute this), $137 billion in savings, and doubled citizen trust in government (from 21% to 44%). Later renamed the National Partnership for Reinventing Government, it became the longest-running government reform effort in modern American history. - Design features: high-profile political leadership (Vice President), clear initial deadline, career civil servant staffing, sustained implementation effort (8 years), explicit focus on culture change not just cuts, the "Hammer Award" to recognize successful reinvention efforts. --- The _Mission État Efficace_ looks under-designed compared to these models. No clear timeline, no independent evaluation mechanism, no automatic triggers, no published framework for what success looks like. Attaching it directly to Matignon (the prime-minister) gives it political access but also makes it vulnerable to political turbulence and internal disagreements - as Morin's departure suggests. The OVfM model (time-limited, scoped, evaluated) and the Rayner model (small unit, borrowed leadership, action through departments) seem more robust than either ad-hoc missions or permanent ministries.