## Notes from 21 December 2025 [[2025-12-20|← Previous note]] ┃ [[2025-12-22|Next note →]] I came across the [Briggs review](https://www.apsc.gov.au/sites/default/files/2025-12/A1_Final%20-%20Briggs%20Review%20Report_Accessible.pdf) while reading [a column](https://johnmenadue.com/post/2025/12/briggs-report-time-for-the-liberals-to-join-the-crossbench-to-pursue-a-genuine-and-lasting-integrit/) by [[Andrew Podger]]. Podger is one of those prolific commentators on civil service reform in Australia - former APS Commissioner, writes constantly about public administration issues. Anyone who knows me knows I always, always use Australia as a reference point on civil service topics, so his consistently critical takes help me keep things in perspective. This time he was writing about how the Albanese government essentially rejected the recommendations of the Briggs review on government board appointments. I had no idea this review even existed. [Lynelle Briggs (also former APS Commissioner) was asked in early 2023 to review the appointments process for government boards](https://www.apsreform.gov.au/resources/communication/review-public-sector-board-appointments-processes). The report is short, simple, easy to understand. The proposals are common sense. It's genuinely surreal that they weren't implemented. Even more surreal that Australia doesn't already have something like this in place - you'd think a country that's generally quite sophisticated on public administration would have sorted this out decades ago. ## What board appointments actually means here The scope: this review focuses specifically on **board appointments** - the roughly 200 governing and decision-making boards that oversee Australian government entities. This includes statutory boards (both full-time and part-time office holders) and significant non-statutory boards where ministers make direct appointments or recommendations. This is **not** about appointments of departmental secretaries, regular civil servants in the APS (Australian Public Service), or operational staff within ministries. Those follow different processes under the Public Service Act. It's also not about Royal Commissions, Commonwealth Courts and tribunals, or advisory committees. The focus is on arms-length governance bodies - think boards of statutory authorities, government business enterprises, regulatory agencies, research institutions. These are the entities that need independence from day-to-day political direction to function properly, but where ministers currently have broad discretion over who gets appointed to govern them. ## What Briggs proposed The core recommendation is straightforward: put in place a new legislation. Not just another policy document or convention that governments can ignore when convenient. Briggs is explicit that legislation is required "to rebuild trust and embed integrity" - she rejects unlegislated conventions because they perpetuate the cycle of both major parties (Liberal and National) saying "the other side will do it when they get in". Here's the process she recommends: **Advance notification and role design:** - Potential board vacancies notified publicly on a regular basis in advance - Ministers and officials determine the range of skills, expertise, experience, and diversity relevant to the role **Competitive search process:** - Independent assessment panels advertise positions on a central government site - Use executive search and other mechanisms to find the widest choice of qualified candidates - Ministers can advise officials about names they'd like considered as part of this competitive process (not outside it) **Panel assessment:** - Panels exclude candidates with unmanageable conflicts of interest - Determine whether the field is sufficient to enable a good appointment - Assess candidates competitively once quality field is obtained - Provide written recommendations with shortlist of highly suitable candidates **Ministerial decision:** - Ministers can meet or converse with recommended candidates to build confidence - Ministers make final decision, including ability to make direct appointments not based on panel recommendations - Direct appointments require explanation to PM and public explanation when announced **Coordination and oversight:** - [[Australian Public Service Commission (APSC)]] (the central HR authority for the Australian federal civil service) assumes responsibility for coordinating board appointment processes - Core operational standards legislated - APSC develops single set of guidelines, training materials, central advertising portal, data collection systems - Public Service Commissioner provides independent assurance through six-monthly reports to Parliament's Public Accounts Committee - External performance review process for boards every five years - Commissioner support for addressing individual board member performance issues including dismissal The oversight model is explicitly based on the [UK's Commissioner for Public Appointments](https://publicappointmentscommissioner.independent.gov.uk/) - panels must include one independent member designated as the Commissioner's representative, the Commissioner signs off on selection plans and assessment panels before processes begin, hears complaints and conducts investigations, audits procedures and practices. This is genuinely common sense stuff. The balance is quite elegant - politicians retain ultimate decision-making authority but there's a robust competitive process that surfaces genuine merit-based options. The transparency requirements create accountability without being onerous. The central coordination through APSC creates institutional memory and continuous improvement of practices. This should absolutely serve as a blueprint for other governments. The framework is transferable - legislated standards, competitive processes with ministerial discretion, central coordination for best practices, performance accountability. Brasil could learn a lot from this, especially the part about advance notification of vacancies and executive search to build candidate pools beyond the usual suspects. ## What the government actually did Nothing substantial. They released an "[_Australian Government Appointments Framework_](https://www.apsc.gov.au/publication/australian-government-appointments-framework)" which is very disappointing. It highlights the three pathways ministers can choose from when making board appointments. 1. **Open competitive pathway** - advertising only "proportionate to the role" (whatever that means), assessment panel chosen by minister, suitability report with unranked candidates 2. **Closed competitive pathway** - identified individuals approached to apply, optional assessment panel determined by minister 3. **Direct pathway** - minister approaches identified candidate(s) in "relevant circumstances" like unique qualifications, previous suitability, or "urgent or exceptional circumstances" Diplomatic appointments explicitly excluded. No legislation. PM&C (Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet - basically the central coordinating ministry, equivalent to Casa Civil in Brasil or the White House in the US) gets responsibility for advising on framework effectiveness instead of APSC. Escape clauses everywhere - "when appropriate and proportionate" ministers should use independent panels. Podger's assessment is very accurate: The government chose political discretion over merit-based integrity. ## The incomplete political safeguards There's an important gap in how Briggs proposes to protect the system itself. She gives the Public Service Commissioner significant power to oversee appointments, sign off on processes, investigate complaints, report to Parliament. But the Commissioner's appointment process has limited political safeguards. Here's how it actually works: The Commissioner is appointed by the Governor-General (the formal head of state, equivalent to a President making ceremonial appointments) for a 5-year term, based on government recommendation following what they call a "merit-based selection process". But that selection process is run by the government itself - in 2023, it was a panel chaired by the Secretary of the Attorney-General's Department. No opposition involvement, no parliamentary confirmation, no bipartisan oversight of the selection. The protection comes on the **removal** side: under Section 47 of the Public Service Act 1999, the Governor-General can only remove the Commissioner if **both** houses of Parliament, in the **same session**, present an address requesting removal. That's actually quite strong - requires both the House of Representatives and the Senate to agree, which typically needs some bipartisan support given how Australian parliaments work. But this creates an asymmetry: strong protection against removal once appointed, but no safeguards on who gets appointed in the first place. If a government appoints a politically sympathetic Commissioner, that person serves a 5-year term with limited accountability except through parliamentary reporting. The Commissioner could theoretically be quite permissive about ministerial appointments without facing consequences until their term ends. This is different from models like the [US MSPB](https://www.mspb.gov/), where members are appointed by the President with Senate confirmation, serve fixed terms, can only be removed for cause, and the board must maintain bipartisan balance. Or the UK Commissioner for Public Appointments, who is appointed through an open competition process and reports to Parliament. Without addressing this, you risk shifting the political capture problem one level up. The system Briggs proposes depends on the Commissioner exercising independent oversight - but if the government controls who becomes Commissioner without checks, that independence is compromised from the start. This might be beyond what Briggs was asked to review - she was commissioned to look at board appointments, not APSC governance. But it's a critical gap. If you're going to vest significant power in an oversight body, you need to think about how that body itself resists capture. ## My take I'm slightly irritated by Briggs' choice to review the process primarily through an integrity lens. Don't get me wrong - integrity matters. But equally or more important is the capacity/agility/delivery lens. And approaching it from that angle might have led to different or additional mechanisms. Briggs does a nice job balancing - lets politicians make final decisions but creates a scenario where direct appointments need to be owned publicly. There's effort not to make the process excessively rigid. But if the approach were centered on state capacity and delivery effectiveness, what other mechanisms would you include? Some possibilities: - Mechanisms specifically for cognitive diversity - not just demographic diversity but diversity of professional backgrounds, problem-solving approaches, sectoral experience - Fast-track mechanisms for people who've performed well in previous government work - if someone crushed it as a board member elsewhere or delivered results in a secondment, accelerate them to final selection stages - Flexibility for urgency that's genuine (not the "urgent or exceptional" escape clause) - maybe a streamlined 30-day process for truly time-sensitive appointments vs. standard 90-day process - Cost considerations - executive search is expensive, maybe tiered approaches based on role complexity - Skills gap analysis - not just filling individual vacancies but strategic workforce planning across all boards to ensure you're building the capabilities government actually needs