## Notes from 30 December 2025 [[2025-12-29|← Previous note]] ┃ [[2025-12-31|Next note →]] "[Civil Service Reform in Latin America: Trends and Challenges](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-90649-7_14)" is out in the Springer collection _Public Policy and Research in Latin America_. I co-authored this chapter with [[Conrado Ramos]] (CLAD) and [[Alejandro Milanesi]] (Universidad de la República, Uruguay). It covers Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay over the last decade (from 2014 to 2024, more or less). Following are some of the main findings: ### The temporary contract escape valve The central finding is that Latin American civil services exist in "dynamic equilibrium" — the push for meritocratic modernization constantly collides with political demand for flexibility. Governments resolve this tension not through structural reform but through temporary contracts that create a parallel, de facto civil service. Chile's _contratas_, Argentina's _contratados_, Peru's CAS contracts — different names, same function. These mechanisms let governments bypass rigid career systems, but at the cost of job security and institutional memory. The numbers are striking. In Argentina, _contratados_ grew 224% between 2003 and 2012, reaching 30% of the workforce. In Chile, 54% of public employees are now _contratas_ (around 250,000 people), with only 22% in statutory positions. These aren't marginal categories — they're where the action is. ### Regularization is not professionalization When pressure builds to address precarious contracts, governments tend to respond with regularization — converting temporary workers to permanent status, often through closed competitions limited to existing staff. Argentina's 2020 plan aims to regularize 37,000 workers this way. Peru's Constitutional Court ruled in 2022 that CAS workers performing permanent duties must receive open-ended contracts. This is politically expedient and addresses real precarity, but it's distinct from professionalization. Closed competitions for incumbents don't expand the talent pool or introduce external competition. Critics see them as mechanisms to formalize patronage appointments rather than advance merit. The chapter argues this distinction — regularization vs. professionalization — is crucial for understanding what reform actually accomplishes. ### What drives reform varies dramatically The reform drivers across countries don't follow a single pattern. Costa Rica's overhaul came from external pressure — OECD accession requirements and IMF loan conditionality pushed through a Public Employment Framework Law after a decade of effort. Chile's changes came not from legislation but from administrative rulings by the Comptroller General's Office (CGR), which progressively restricted flexible hiring and established that _contrata_ employees gain job protection after two renewals. In Argentina and Peru, court decisions interpreting labor rights shaped the trajectory. Brazil's PEC 32/2020 stalled in Congress amid political opposition and then a change in government. This variation matters for understanding leverage points. External fiscal pressure works in some contexts (Costa Rica). Oversight bodies can drive change without legislative consensus (Chile). But ambitious legislative projects face high failure rates when political conditions shift (Brazil, Peru's SERVIR). ### Executive personnel systems aren't consolidating One area where modernization efforts have struggled across the board is the professionalization of senior civil servants. Chile has the most developed executive personnel system in the region, but involuntary turnover at the end of political terms remains around 70% — trust and political affinity still dominate over merit. Peru's _Cuerpo de Gerentes Públicos_ launched with promise in 2008 but has been losing traction, with declining interest from government entities. Argentina's executive segment remains highly politicized, with 180-day temporary appointments to senior positions routinely extended through administrations. The pattern suggests that even where formal systems exist, the political logic of patronage at senior levels persists. Building a professional senior civil service may require different tools than reforming the broader workforce. ### No new institutions A notable absence in recent years: no new institutional structures for civil service management have emerged. Earlier waves produced Chile's SADP (Alta Dirección Pública) and Peru's SERVIR. Recent reforms amplify or modify existing models rather than creating new entities. Whether this reflects institutional maturation or reform fatigue is unclear. The chapter notes that local government level might be where innovation happens next, but evidence is thin.