## Notes from 03 January 2026 [[2026-01-02|← Previous note]] ┃ [[2026-01-04|Next note →]] [Paul Ovenden](https://www.linkedin.com/posts/paul-ovenden-367a15145_alaa-abd-el-fattah-has-shown-supremacy-of-activity-7413158054545788929-EMwC/), former Director of Strategy at No. 10 under Starmer, published a [piece in _The Times_](https://www.thetimes.com/article/3720f3d7-b0b4-4dc1-a46c-3d37d72df871?shareToken=c05dae6ea18dfc9f97c64b4ffeef8615) and appeared on [Times Radio](https://x.com/TimesRadio/status/2007028166678765764) programme critiquing what he calls the "Stakeholder State." Ovenden's core argument: the government has become captive to "a complex coalition of campaign groups, regulators, litigators, trade bodies and well-networked organisations" that saps time and energy from voters' actual priorities. He calls this the "supremacy of the stakeholder state" — where "consultations and reviews are the sacred texts" and government "rows with muffled oars" to appease organized interests. The Stakeholder State, he argues, "isn't a grand conspiracy" but rather "a morbid symptom of a state that has got bigger and bigger while simultaneously and systematically emasculating itself." **This sounds familiar.** It's the UK version of the American vetocracy debate or the [Corporatist Republic](https://seul.ar/ni-yanquis-ni-marxistas-corporativistas/) that [[Seul Magazine]] identifies in Argentina, and it fits the Brazilian case just as well. [Francis Fukuyama's diagnosis of American institutional decay](https://www.persuasion.community/p/vetocracy-and-the-undermining-of-american-global-power) (too many veto points, too many organized interests with blocking power, too little executive capacity to act) maps directly onto what Ovenden describes. Fortunately, more people are thinking about solutions: the abundance agenda is fundamentally about restoring the state's capacity to _do things_ over the objections of incumbent stakeholders. The deeper problem may be what my friend [[Diogo Costa]] calls _"Hesitocracy"_ — a system where everyone is afraid to make decisions because any action creates liability, controversy, or stakeholder backlash. Risk aversion becomes the default. "De-risking" governance by outsourcing decisions to consultations, reviews, and arm's-length bodies means no one is actually responsible for outcomes. [[Executive decisiveness]] atrophies. [[Joe Hill]] from [[Re:State]] offered a useful [response on LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7412836041528668160/): he agrees with the diagnosis but worries that "just stiffening our spines" makes reform sound too easy. The Stakeholder State "doesn't come from nowhere — its roots go deep, and it's resisted successive attempts to reform it." There are real political costs to fighting it. [[Alex Thomas]] from the [[Institute for Government]] [pushed back](https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2026/jan/02/downing-street-only-has-itself-to-blame-for-lack-of-grip-on-whitehall-say-experts): "I don't think he's wrong on it being hard to get stuff done, but am not sure the 'stakeholder' framing is helpful." Fortunately, I know that the growing UK [[Abundance Agenda - Progress Studies#United Kingdom|abundance/growth ecosystem]] is grappling with these questions (something I miss everywhere else). How do you restore executive capacity in a system designed to diffuse it? How do you stop judicial review expansion, consultation, and permitting requirements? Same underlying problem, different institutional expression.