## Notes from 11 January 2026 [[2026-01-10|← Previous note]] ┃ [[2026-01-12|Next note →]] Trying to map what's happening with [[Sturzenegger’s reforms|civil service reform in Argentina under Federico Sturzenegger's]] Ministry of Deregulation and State Transformation. The news coverage is fragmented and political, so piecing together the actual policy trajectory requires some effort. ## What they've done sofar **Phase 1 (2024–early 2025): Reduction and deregulation.** The "motosierra" (chainsaw) phase. Over 60,000 public sector workers dismissed across the national administration. Hiring freeze. Contract non-renewals. Elimination of entire agencies. The stated goals: fiscal surplus, smaller state. **Phase 2 (late 2025–2026): Professionalization.** The government is now framing this as "building a smaller but more professional state". A [january 2026 decree (931/2025)](https://www.boletinoficial.gob.ar/detalleAviso/primera/337034/20260102) instructs Sturzenegger's ministry to establish a "new public employment system based on transparency, meritocracy, and performance". This is where things get interesting. ## What's actually been implemented **Competency exams (SEP).** The [Sistema de Evaluación Pública](https://www.argentina.gob.ar/sistema-de-evaluacion-publica) required ~40,000 contract employees to pass a standardized test (reading comprehension, logical reasoning, public administration knowledge) to have their contracts renewed. Digital, anonymous, presential. Three attempts allowed. Results: 98% passed. Unions called it a "[humiliating](https://www.pagina12.com.ar/790596-examenes-a-estatales-una-experiencia-humillante-que-fue-judi/)" (of course they do) exercise designed to stigmatize workers, and pointed out that existing collective agreements already have evaluation mechanisms. The government responded by saying passing the exam is "necessary but not sufficient" for contract renewal—i.e., you can pass and still be dismissed. The exam is now a permanent requirement for new hires (Resolution 48/2025). Interesting as a floor-setting mechanism, but the 98% pass rate suggests it's not actually filtering much. **Merit selection for the new Competition Authority (ANCA).** This is notable. The Autoridad Nacional de la Competencia was created by law in 2018 but never actually constituted. The Milei government ran a proper public competition ([_concurso público de antecedentes y oposición_](https://www.argentina.gob.ar/desregulacion/transformacion-del-estado-y-funcion-publica/concursar/convocatoria-abierta-7-cargos-de-la-autoridad-nacional-de-la-competencia)) for the president, four tribunal members, and two secretaries. The process ran March–November 2025: open call, CV evaluation, technical assessment, interviews, project presentations. The Anti-Corruption Office reviewed the finalists. This is the first time Argentina has done competitive selection for senior public positions since the Macri administration. **[Pay unfreezing for senior officials](https://tn.com.ar/politica/2025/12/13/tras-dos-anos-de-congelamiento-el-gobierno-prepara-un-aumento-de-sueldo-para-los-funcionarios/).** A December 2025/January 2026 decree unfroze salaries for ministers, secretaries, subsecretaries, and national directors. The rationale: frozen pay made it impossible to attract private sector talent for leadership positions. The same decree authorized Sturzenegger to modify entry, promotion, and remuneration systems. ## What's announced but not yet implemented **[Productivity component in salaries](https://www.elobservador.com.uy/argentina/politica/javier-milei-habilito-federico-sturzenegger-modificar-el-sistema-ingresos-y-ascensos-el-estado-n6029890).** The government wants to add a productivity element to public sector pay, breaking the "automatism" of across-the-board increases. The design is still unclear: how do you measure productivity across very different functions? How do you link it to verifiable goals without creating more bureaucracy? This is a very hard problem. Linking individual compensation to organizational performance in government is something many countries have attempted and few have done well. The [Canadian Working Group on Public Service Productivity](https://www.canada.ca/en/government/system/government-wide-reporting-spending-operations/committees-task-forces/working-group-public-service-productivity-overview/working-group-public-service-productivity-response.html) (reporting December 2025) recommended that Statistics Canada develop a productivity measurement program for the public sector using a direct output approach. The Treasury Board Secretariat's response: "[not being considered at this time due to other government priorities](https://www.hrreporter.com/news/hr-news/measure-productivity-in-the-public-sector-not-being-considered/393868)". If Canada (with far stronger institutional capacity) won't can't commit to measuring public sector productivity, the idea that Argentina can link individual pay to organizational productivity seems ambitious. The measurement problem is genuinely hard. **Comprehensive career reform.** The decree language mentions a "new public employment system" that would address: entry mechanisms, promotion pathways, remuneration calculation, and (implicitly) the fragmented system of supplements and special regimes that have accumulated over decades. What this might include: - Transversal career tracks (vs. agency-specific silos) - Market-benchmarked compensation (especially for tech and specialized roles) - Performance-linked progression (vs. pure tenure) - Harmonization of the patchwork of _adicionales_, _suplementos_, and parallel structures