## Notes from 26 January 2026 [[2026-01-15|← Previous note]] ┃ [[2026-01-27|Next note →]] Both Canada and Germany recently announced civil service reductions, but with different scope and detail. Canada’s Carney administration is implementing a 12% cut specifically to _executive_ positions (about 1,120 jobs). In Canadian federal HR language, “executives” are the senior management cadre (EX-1 to EX-5)—roughly the band between directors and the very top of departments. Publicly, Budget 2025 commits to reducing 1,000 executive positions over two years; [The Functionary](https://44615331.hs-sites.com/executive-cuts) reports internal guidance aiming for 12% (~1,120) by March 2028. This is _not_ a general civil service reduction: most frontline and operational roles are not targeted (by this specific goal). Germany’s 2025 coalition agreement sets an 8% staffing reduction across the federal administration (_Bundesverwaltung_) over the legislative period. According to [the vbw study](2026-01-25.md), federal ministries grew from roughly 15,000 positions in 2013 to over 22,000 by 2024 (about a 47% increase) while personnel costs doubled and grew much faster than GDP. ## Government Playbook vs. Demographic Attrition The difference is in implementation mechanics. Canada’s Treasury Board Secretariat and OCHRO (the central HR function) issued an operational playbook to deputy ministers on _how_ to execute the cuts. In plain terms, the playbook tries to “rebuild the org chart” so the executive layer is **thinner and more managerial** (not a collection of titles), while keeping critical functions safe. Key levers include: eliminating executive roles that manage fewer than 3 direct reports; removing “associate/assistant” add-on titles that often signal role inflation rather than new responsibilities; and enforcing a clearer hierarchy shape (many managers at the bottom, progressively fewer as you go up), to avoid a “cylinder” where too many people sit at similar senior levels. It also uses **size-based norms**: the centre sets expectations for how many top-tier managers a department should have given its overall headcount—so smaller organizations are pushed to run with a smaller senior bench, rather than importing a “big ministry” structure. The playbook targets specific dysfunctions that slow delivery: “classification creep” (jobs upgraded without real duty changes), approval chains that push memos through too many layers, and duplication created by compressed senior grades. Germany’s approach leans more on demographic attrition and hiring freezes (“one-in-two-out”) than on active organizational redesign. With a large share of the German civil service close to retirement, the 8% target can be met mainly through natural turnover rather than workforce adjustment notices or explicit delayering directives. ## Surgical Redesign vs. Fiscal Weight Loss Canada is doing something closer to organizational surgery: it targets concrete hierarchy pathologies (vertical stacking, horizontal title sprawl, approval chain hardening). The unit of change is _decision flow_. Germany is closer to fiscal weight loss: it caps total headcount and lets retirement dynamics do much of the work, without much visible operational detail on which layers, titles, or approval structures are the priority. The coalition agreement mostly provides a percentage target, not an intervention framework. Which pay grades are suffering from unhealthy compression? Where does legitimate mandate growth end and role proliferation begin? Without diagnostic depth comparable to Canada’s playbook, the 8% risks becoming headcount arithmetic rather than real reform. Numbers without method invite either blunt cuts or strategic gaming... where essential capacity erodes while politically protected positions remain.