## Notes from 27 January 2026 [[2026-01-26|← Previous note]] ┃ [[2026-01-28|Next note →]] I came across a [VoxUkraine piece](https://voxukraine.org/en/why-people-do-not-trust-the-state-myths-surrounding-the-public-administration-reform-in-ukraine) published yesterday that analyzes common myths about Ukraine's public administration reform. The article addresses distrust in state institutions (79% of Ukrainians distrust the state apparatus according to 2025 polling) and tackles several misconceptions about civil service transformation, anti-corruption bodies, and corporate governance in state-owned enterprises. What caught my attention was their discussion of supervisory board composition for SOEs, specifically the controversy around foreign members serving on these boards. Ukrainian politicians have repeatedly framed the presence of foreigners on supervisory boards as evidence of "external governance," suggesting state enterprises operate in the interests of international partners rather than Ukraine. VoxUkraine counters this by explaining that OECD guidelines on corporate governance of SOEs prioritize independence of board members, not their nationality. Foreign professionals are involved precisely because their careers and reputations create stronger incentives against corruption... they risk their standing not just in Ukraine but globally. The piece provides examples from Lithuania's Ignitis Group (6 of 9 supervisory board members are foreign), Latvia's Air Baltic (2 of 5), and the Netherlands' FMO bank (2 of 6), noting that OECD standards only recommend restricting board membership to citizens when national security risks exist. This framing is rare in Brazilian public administration debates, where nationality requirements for public sector positions remain extensive and largely unquestioned. The default assumption is that serving the Brazilian state requires Brazilian citizenship, with little systematic discussion about whether this actually serves state capacity or merely protects incumbents. But the logic VoxUkraine presents - that what matters is independence and competence (including appropriate language skills and contextual knowledge), not passport color - should apply to most public functions. The legitimate domains where citizenship genuinely matters are narrower than current practice suggests: elected positions with democratic representation functions, certain national security roles, positions involving exercise of sovereign powers. Beyond that? Nationality restrictions primarily reduce the talent pool and make it easier to circulate the same networks through different appointments. Brazil has no external pressure forcing this question—no EU accession process demanding institutional upgrades, no wartime urgency exposing governance weaknesses. Which may explain why these assumptions remain unexamined. Though maybe we need what I'd call a "[[Carlo Ancelotti Law]]" to shift the conversation: since 2025, Brazil's national football team has been coached by an Italian, Carlo Ancelotti, who will become the first foreigner to lead the Seleção in a World Cup. If Brazilians can trust a foreigner with something as nationally important as World Cup strategy (and anyone who thinks football isn't a matter of state hasn't spent much time in Brazil), perhaps we could extend that principle to, say, regulatory agencies or state enterprise governance. Obviously the comparison is absurd but the absurdity is sort of the point. We've already accepted that optimal performance sometimes requires looking beyond national borders for specialized expertise. Just hasn't translated to public administration yet.