## Notes from 28 January 2026 [[2026-01-27|← Previous note]] ┃ [[2026-01-29|Next note →]] Kapil Dhabu and Surbhi Arul’s article in _India Development Review_ (“[India’s mission mode schemes: Built to scale, but are they built to last?](https://idronline.org/article/advocacy-government/indias-mission-mode-schemes-built-to-scale-but-are-they-built-to-last/)”, 23 Dec 2025) describes indian_mission-mode programmes_ as government initiatives aimed at specific, high-priority outcomes within a defined timeframe - typically backed by concentrated resources, streamlined processes, and tight monitoring. The piece argues that this architecture is great at producing large, visible outputs quickly (toilets built, tap connections delivered, etc), but often struggles to convert that momentum into social outcomes... because sustained change depends on institutions, capabilities, ongoing financing, local ownership, and accountability that remain after the “mission” spotlight moves on. This made me think of Brazil’s PAC (Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento): a federal “growth acceleration” umbrella meant to coordinate and push priority investments, paired with institutional/management measures to unlock execution capacity. And it also reminded me of a recurring governance weirdness I’ve always felt with these models: _“if the rules make things slow, instead of changing the rules, we keep them for everyone else and create exceptions for a shortlist of priorities.”_ Brazil’s experience with special, accelerated procurement approaches (for example the RDC, created in 2011 to speed up major procurement projects) shows how attractive that workaround is. But it can weaken the incentive to fix the baseline rulebook (because the ‘fast lane’ becomes the real solution), and it creates a predictable political economy where everyone fights to get _their_ project reclassified as exceptional - turning “priority” into a contested label and vanishing discipline for systemic reform.