## Notes from 01 April 2026 [[2026-04-03|← Previous note]] ┃ [[2026-04-05|Next note →]] Interesting paper: Hendra, [[Eko Prasojo|Prasojo]], and Fathurrahman (2026) [develop the concept](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8500.70038) of **compensatory informality** through a study of the Indonesian bureaucracy, showing how informal networks take over when formal systems fail. A key finding is the state of **pathological stability**: while informal workarounds—like "collaborative budgeting" (_keroyokan_) and personal messaging—keep daily operations running, they actually keep the formal system's flaws in place. By making a broken system "good enough" to survive, these practices remove the pressure on leaders to fix the underlying structural problems. This creates an institutional "lock-in" where the formal "cage" stays rigid because the informal **"[[Escape from Public Law|escape hatch]]"** provides a working survival strategy. The authors argue that this success hides a lack of real accountability and transparency. This offers a clear parallel to the "flight from public law": by moving governance to informal, "off the books" personal ties, the organization avoids the friction of official rules but trades its long-term health for short-term results.