## Notes from 07 April 2026 [[2026-04-06|← Previous note]] ┃ [[2026-04-08|Next note →]] [This paper (Pal, 2025)](https://juanpal.com/files/pal-jmp.pdf) looks at a Chilean policy (_[Beca Vocación de Profesor](https://portal.beneficiosestudiantiles.cl/preguntas-frecuentes/beca-vocacion-de-profesor-0)_) that tried to get better people into teaching not by raising salaries, but by intervening earlier — at the university admission stage. The idea: offer full-tuition scholarships to high-scoring students who choose teaching degrees, while requiring participating colleges to enforce a minimum admission score. The scholarship makes teaching attractive for strong candidates; the admission floor keeps out the weakest ones. Using the sharp eligibility cutoff for the scholarship (the top 20% of test-takers of the national college entrance exam), Pal finds a 42% jump in enrollment at teacher colleges, with the effect twice as large for low-income students. These better-prepared students went on to become measurably better teachers: a 0.11 SD increase in Teacher Value Added once they reached the classroom. The most interesting finding is the comparison with... increasing teachers salaries. Pal's simulations show that to get the same improvement in recruitment quality through wage increases, salaries would need to go up by roughly 35%. And even then, the composition effect would be weaker, because higher wages attract more candidates but give colleges no reason to raise their own standards. The broader takeaway: that well-designed education incentives can outperform wage hikes for recruiting public servants. And that applies to any field where the state is the main employer.