## Notes from 18 April 2026 [[2026-04-17|← Previous note]] ┃ [[2026-04-19|Next note →]] A [new post](https://rafaeljimenezasensio.com/2026/02/22/la-regulacion-de-la-direccion-publica-algunos-equivocos/) from [[Rafael Jiménez Asensio]] makes an uncomfortable argument about why senior civil service reform so consistently under-delivers. His starting point is technical but the implication is political: in Spain, professional public management reform has always been regulated through employment and civil service law — but that body of law, by design, only covers the lower tiers of the administrative hierarchy. The senior positions that actually set policy direction sit in a separate legal category governed by political appointment rules, and no amount of civil service reform can touch them. Parties have every incentive to keep it that way, and the legal architecture obliges. The broader point travels beyond Spain: senior civil service reform fails when it is treated purely as a _policy_ question — tweaking HR regulations and merit rules — while ignoring that the real barrier is _politics_ (patronage systems that parties will not voluntarily dismantle) embedded in _polity_ (the organizational laws that define the structure of the executive branch itself). Civil service legislation can only reach so far; the positions that matter are protected by a different layer of law entirely. Jiménez Asensio's argument is that until reformers work at the polity level — reshaping how the executive is organizationally structured — the politics of patronage will continue to find a comfortable legal home, and the policy fixes will keep missing the point.