# Impact of Executive Personnel Systems Evidence on whether and how the selection, tenure, and management of senior public executives affects organizational performance. The literature cuts across public administration, economics, and political science, and uses varying units of analysis (federal programs, hospitals, schools, administrative offices) and identification strategies. Results are mixed and context-dependent. --- ## Entries ### Do senior executives matter? General evidence **Muñoz, P., & Otero, C. (2025). Managers and Public Hospital Performance. _American Economic Review_, 115(11), 4040–4074. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20240615** - Context: Chilean public hospitals; hospital CEOs selected through the Sistema de Alta Dirección Pública (SADP), a competitive senior executive system established in 2003 - Method: Exploits the introduction of competitive recruitment and better pay for public hospital CEOs via SADP - Finding: Reform reduced hospital mortality by 8%. Effect is not explained by changes in patient composition. - Mechanism: Policy changed the pool of CEOs by displacing doctors without management training in favor of managers with formal management education. Productivity gains were concentrated in hospitals that recruited higher-quality CEOs. - Notes: One of the strongest causal estimates linking a senior executive selection system to service delivery outcomes. For the SADP design (merit shortlist + political appointment + at-will tenure + bipartisan oversight council), see [[Sistema de Alta Dirección Pública (SADP)]]. **Fenizia, A. (2022). Managers and Productivity in the Public Sector. _Econometrica_, 90(3), 1063–1084. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA19244** - Context: Italian administrative offices (passport/ID processing); homogeneous output - Method: Quasi-experimental rotation of managers across offices; manager fixed effects - Finding: Managers explain ~9% of total productivity variation. +1 SD in managerial quality → ~+10% productivity. Optimal reallocation of managers across offices would raise aggregate productivity by ~7% - Mechanism: Mainly through workforce composition changes (older workers exit when a more productive manager arrives) --- **Janke, K., Propper, C., & Sadun, R. (2019). The Impact of CEOs in the Public Sector: Evidence from the English NHS. NBER Working Paper No. 25853. https://www.nber.org/papers/w25853** - Context: English public hospitals (NHS); large, complex organizations - Method: CEO mobility across hospitals; broad range of performance metrics - Finding: Despite pay differentiation between CEOs, little evidence of causal impact on hospital production (inputs, operational outcomes, clinical outcomes) - Mechanism: Authors suggest top-level leadership change may be a weak lever without complementary organizational reform; point toward middle management as more proximate driver --- **Lavy, V., & Boiko, A. (2017). Management Quality in Public Education: Superintendent Value-Added, Student Outcomes and Mechanisms. NBER Working Paper No. 24028. https://www.nber.org/papers/w24028** - Context: Israeli primary schools; superintendents as CEOs of ~15-school clusters - Method: Quasi-random rotation of superintendents (Ministry rule every 3-5 years); value-added estimation - Finding: +1 SD in superintendent quality → ~+0.04 SD in test scores (math, Hebrew, English). Effect is non-linear — concentrated in top quartile (~0.13 SD). No heterogeneity by student SES. - Mechanism: Clearer school priorities and working procedures; school climate interventions reducing violence; increased probability of principal replacement in year 2 after arrival. No effect on resources or instruction time. --- ### Career vs. political appointees: US federal evidence **Gilmour, J. B., & Lewis, D. E. (2006). Political Appointees and the Competence of Federal Program Management. _American Politics Research_, 34(1), 22–50. [https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X042719](https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X04271905)** - Method: Bush administration management grades (PART scores) by type of bureau chief - Finding: Politically appointed bureau chiefs receive systematically lower management grades than SES career executives across most categories - Notable detail: Noncareer SES appointees perform comparably to career SES — being embedded in SES structures may matter more than the appointment type per se --- **Lewis, D. E. (2007). Testing Pendleton's Premise: Do Political Appointees Make Worse Bureaucrats? _The Journal of Politics_, 69(4), 1073–1088. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00608.x** - Method: PART scores; compares bureau chiefs by career vs. political appointment - Finding: Career managers outperform political appointees on program performance metrics. The advantage runs through bureau experience and tenure — not education or private-sector background (which are uncorrelated with performance) - Implication: Selection criteria for appointees should prioritize institutional experience, not generic credentials --- **Perry, J. L., & Miller, T. K. (1991). The Senior Executive Service: Is It Improving Managerial Performance? _Public Administration Review_, 51(6), 554–563. https://doi.org/10.2307/976606** - Method: Merit Systems Protection Board survey data (1986); structural model of SES policy logic - Finding: Evidence supports many intended consequences of SES reform, but also unintended effects — particularly around career/noncareer interface and public confidence - Notes: Early and somewhat dated, but useful for understanding what the SES was designed to do vs. what it delivered. Raises tension between merit protection and performance accountability.