# Crafting a Brazilian model of secularism (_This text was co-authored with Francisco Gaetani and Tabata Amaral. It was [originally published](https://www.poder360.com.br/opiniao/a-construcao-de-um-secularismo-brasileiro/) in the Brazilian newspaper Poder360 on October 27, 2022) The debate about the influence of religion on Brazilian politics is becoming increasingly prominent and heated, especially in even-numbered years. With the numerical growth of Evangelicals and their increasing influence on national politics, segments of the elite, especially the more progressive ones, have come to see this advance as a potential "threat to democracy." There is no doubt that Jair Bolsonaro (PL) represents a threat to democratic institutions—and that the president's political and electoral success is due, in part, to the alliance he has established with parts of the religious electorate. However, is it correct to interpret these conjunctural conditions as signs that the rise of Evangelicals represents a threat to our country? This is an inadequate reading of a complex phenomenon, lacking in-depth reflections and deserving of the attention of Brazilian society also in odd-numbered years. A first fundamental error is to interpret the evolution of the religious scenario in Brazil through foreign lenses. Despite the fact that the rise of the authoritarian populist right is a global phenomenon, the characteristics of our country's religious transition are quite peculiar. For example, unlike American Christian nationalism, which is eminently white and nostalgic, Brazilian Evangelicals are mostly poor and brown, and the expression of their faith has historically been the target of prejudice. That is, it is not a phenomenon imposed by the State or sponsored by economic or cultural elites, but the expression of the free religious association of Brazilians, especially the poorest and least educated. The way Brazilians express their religiosity is changing rapidly, but the key concepts we use to understand the relationship between religion and State remain the same. In other words, we do not have adequate tools that allow us to understand the phenomenon without first judging it as a risk. One of these concepts is the separation of Church and State. We adopted in Brazil the French notion of laicism, which arose from the need to free the political community from the domination of an official and hierarchical church - the Catholic Church. In this sense, the French tradition emphasizes collective freedom in relation to religious institutions and gives the State a prominent role in protecting this freedom. This is why French public servants are prohibited from displaying religious symbols in the exercise of their functions. However, the French notion of laicism is not the only model of separation between Church and State. In the USA, the notion of secularism was built with the arrival of immigrants fleeing religious persecution in Europe. Therefore, American secularism emphasizes individual freedom and the protection of religious diversity in the public space. For this reason, the idea of suppressing the expression of religion in public or private environments is simply inconceivable in this tradition. In India and Turkey, secularism is understood as one of the foundations of national identity, but the way the State deals with religious matters in the two countries is profoundly different. In both cases, however, there is room for the "active neutrality" of public power, when the State is authorized to regulate religion to interrupt intra-religious oppression (aiming at the protection of women in Islam and the untouchables in Hinduism, for example) or inter-religious oppression (as is the case with the protection of religious minorities in India). We highlight these differences to say that secularism and laicism mean different things to different societies, and that we will need to construct our own concepts if we want to get out of the imbroglio we find ourselves in. Up to now, French laicism has played an important role in a Brazil with an overwhelming Catholic majority. However, the profound transformation that our country is undergoing requires us to undertake three urgent tasks: 1. There is a demand for more active participation of religious people in political life. It is necessary to understand their aspirations and develop a concept of secularism appropriate to the Brazilian reality - one that protects individual and collective religious freedom, including that of agnostics and atheists, but develops mechanisms that promote the positive participation of religious communities in public debate. . 2. The growth of religious communities can be understood, at least in part, as a reaction to the perception of social fragmentation (caused by real or imagined phenomena, such as the increase in economic vulnerability resulting from the flexibilization of labor relations, the increase in urban violence, or a supposed threat of an exclusionary identitarianism, etc.). In this context, churches emerge to meet individual and collective needs for security, as mutual aid communities, and belonging. In different ways, for each of us, authors of this article, the church has played an extremely important role in our lives, providing us with opportunities for leadership, education, leisure, and even food assistance in times of greatest difficulty. Today, entire communities depend on religion to face the vacuum of public policies in the most vulnerable regions. . 3. Finally, we need to develop a new institutional architecture to promote the positive participation of religious people in public debate, as well as invest in the construction of platforms that allow society to understand the extent and impact of their work in communities throughout Brazil. This new structure should invest, for example: . 1. in the mapping of religious communities and the social work they carry out; 2. in the promotion of structured dialogue between religious communities in the development of public policies; 3. in the encouragement of interreligious dialogue; and 4. in the financing of research on religion and the training of religious leaders in civil matters. This institutional architecture must also improve the existing mechanisms of partnership between the State and religious communities, especially in the areas of education (faith-based schools and universities) and health (religious hospitals and therapeutic communities). The proposal to have an institutional architecture dedicated to organizing the relationship between the State and religious communities is not unprecedented and is present in different democracies. Under the administration of Democratic Mayor Eric Adams, New York instituted in 2022 an [Office of Faith-Based and Community Partnerships](https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/069-22/mayor-adams-creates-new-office-faith-based-community-partnerships#/0). Chile has a [National Office of Religious Affairs](https://www.onar.gob.cl/), and Sweden has the Swedish Agency for Support to Faith Communities ([_Myndighetensst_](https://www.myndighetensst.se/)). Even France has an [Interministerial Committee for Laicism](https://www.gouvernement.fr/le-comite-interministeriel-de-la-laicite). What we propose here is not the weakening of the separation of Church and State, which must be protected. What we suggest is the updating of our collective beliefs about the relationship between religion and democracy, so that these relations can take place in a positive way. With this, we do not mean that there are not serious problems today that must be addressed. There are indeed religious leaders who criminally encourage attacks on other religions, especially those of African origin, and on minority groups, using their influence, including, to expand the role of churches in defining the allocation of State resources. However, it is also necessary to recognize that the majority of Evangelicals do not support the political right or Bolsonaro due to the guidance of these leaders, but because they identify with their agendas. In other words, there is a considerable portion of the population that feels that their demands and identities are not heard, or even recognized as valid, by other political leaders. The growth of Evangelicals is a complex, ambiguous, and poorly understood phenomenon. Associating the expansion of these communities with the weakening of democracy makes any dialogue impossible. And if there is one thing that Brazil has been lacking, it is dialogue.