# Human rights in Brazil, silence on Venezuela (_An earlier Portuguese [version](https://exame.com/colunistas/instituto-millenium/direitos-humanos-no-brasil-silencio-na-venezuela/) of this text appeared on December 18, 2023, in Instituto Millenium’s column for Exame magazine_) During the administrations of the Workers’ Party (PT), Brazil’s stance toward Venezuela has been marked by an uncomfortable silence. Faced with the authoritarian escalation and worsening humanitarian crisis brought about by chavismo in the neighboring country, the Brazilian government refrained from issuing criticism. This silence not only underscores the delicate nature of the Venezuelan issue on Itamaraty’s international agenda but also highlights the failure of Brazil’s recent approaches to play a constructive role in resolving Venezuela’s political crisis. Brasília watched Venezuela’s democratic erosion toward authoritarianism from the sidelines. On the rare occasions when the Brazilian Foreign Ministry attempted a more critical stance, it was promptly overruled. A notable example occurred in 2011, when a [firm speech](https://g1.globo.com/brasil/noticia/2011/10/apos-mal-estar-governo-brasileiro-manda-carta-de-apoio-a-venezuela-1.html) by Brazil’s ambassador to the UN Human Rights Council was followed by a letter from the Brazilian government touting the “advances in human rights” achieved during Chávez’s administration. Under Lula’s third term, Brazil’s approach to Venezuela remains unaltered, despite overwhelming evidence of human rights abuses and the devastating impact of Chávez and Maduro’s economic policies. In 2019, a [detailed report](https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/07/1041902?utm_source=UN+News+-+Newsletter&utm_campaign=a5cf4411b1-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_07_04_07_30&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_fdbf1af606-a5cf4411b1-105798721) by Michelle Bachelet, the socialist former president of Chile and then-UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, documented widespread violations by the Venezuelan government, including repression, torture, disappearances, and killings of political opponents. Despite such evidence, the PT’s relationship with the Venezuelan regime remained defined by [friendly reciprocity](https://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/noticia/2023/06/conceito-de-democracia-e-relativo-diz-lula-ao-defender-maduro.ghtml). In 2023, the Venezuelan government’s alarming maneuver - reminiscent of Argentina’s dictatorship -demonstrated a tactic of creating an external enemy to rally internal support. This context frames Venezuela’s recent threats to invade and annex more than half of Guyana’s territory. Targeting Guyana, a nation with newly discovered extensive oil reserves, Maduro seeks to distract from the catastrophic state of Venezuela’s economy. Tensions escalated with the announcement of a referendum, [marred by allegations of fraud](https://www.lanacion.com.ar/el-mundo/sospechas-de-fraude-ante-los-10-millones-de-votos-del-referendum-patriotico-de-nicolas-maduro-nid04122023/), whose results serve as justification for intensified hostility toward Guyana. Maduro’s strategy of stoking nationalism coincides with [negotiations for lifting U.S. sanctions](https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/internacional/venezuela-apos-acordo-sobre-eleicoes-e-alivio-de-sancoes-dos-eua-governo-liberta-opositores-presos/), conditioned on holding transparent elections in 2024. The referendum’s timing - just a day after significant [opposition primaries](https://www.dw.com/es/maduro-dice-que-primarias-opositoras-fueron-un-mega-fraude/a-67192750) naming María Corina Machado as the presidential candidate for 2025 - suggests an attempt to shift public attention. Machado’s ineligibility had been decreed earlier in the year by the Comptroller General’s Office, under Elvis Amoroso, a loyal chavista who now [presides over the electoral authority](https://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2023/12/04/656e2c72fdddff459d8b4589.html) organizing the referendum. Venezuela’s belligerent rhetoric, while not yet leading to conflict, has had tangible consequences. For instance, Maduro’s government announced a [$680 million budget](https://twitter.com/realsardenberg/status/1736020118281322868) to develop logistical capacity along the border with Guyana. Laws related to the annexation are being used to [silence and imprison political opponents](https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/internacional/noticia/2023-12/venezuela-prende-oposicionista-e-emite-mandados-de-prisao-por-traicao). Caracas has declared [Venezuelan citizenship for residents of Essequibo](https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/venezuela-guyana_venezuela-comenzar%C3%A1-a-entregar-la-nacionalidad-a-habitantes-de-zona-disputada-con-guyana/49034620#:~:text=%2D%20El%20presidente%20de%20Venezuela%2C%20Nicol%C3%A1s,cuadrados%2C%20actualmente%20bajo%20control%20de) and deployed a military division to the region. Meanwhile, Guyana has considered allowing a [U.S. military base](https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/articles/c6pr237d1g7o) on its territory - a strategic defeat for Brazil’s Lula government, which has long sought to keep foreign military installations out of the Amazon region. The situation threatens to destabilize political stability across South America, a region notable for its relative peace in terms of territorial conflicts between nation-states. The Venezuelan regime’s fear of losing power - and facing justice for its crimes under an opposition coalition - could lead to the irrational decision of starting an armed conflict, triggering a cycle of violence in which Brazil might be compelled to intervene. The risk of conflict must be taken seriously - not least because history nearly saw it materialize. In 1969, a separatist movement known as the [Rupununi Rebellion](https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rebeli%C3%A3o_de_Rupununi) erupted in the region Venezuela now seeks to annex. Venezuela armed and funded this insurgency. Documents and interviews with Brazilian military personnel reveal that Venezuelan troops used Brazilian territory as a transit route to Rupununi. Brazilian Army intervention led to the capture of Venezuelan soldiers, who were taken to Manaus and later released, as well as the seizure of over two tons of weapons and three military jeeps used by the insurgents. [According to a Brazilian Army officer involved in the operation](https://www.funag.gov.br/ipri/btd/index.php/component/content/article/10-dissertacoes/2421-dissuasao-convencional-na-america-do-sul-o-caso-da-triplice-fronteira-venezuela-brasil-guiana-2), Venezuela’s support for the Rupununi rebels was thwarted due to Brazil’s actions. This episode illustrates how the PT’s foreign policy, centered on non-intervention, failed to anticipate and mitigate chavista behavior, resulting in Brazil’s loss of leadership and influence in South America. The PT’s foreign policy, focused on avoiding direct confrontations and favoring behind-the-scenes diplomacy, has proven ineffective. Attempts to influence Maduro to abandon his authoritarian policies were unsuccessful. This approach, however, exposed contradictions, particularly regarding human rights. The PT displayed leniency toward Venezuela while criticizing countries like Israel. Such inconsistency undermines Brazil’s international credibility and its commitment to human rights and democracy. This contradiction is particularly evident in the government’s emphasis on Venezuelan sovereignty, avoiding criticism of the human rights situation. This stance has dominated Brazilian diplomacy and international human rights forums, reflecting a reluctance to recognize the legitimacy of multilateral intervention in Venezuela. Paradoxically, the Workers’ Party (PT) did not hesitate to use these same mechanisms against opponents, as seen in the [complaint against Bolsonaro at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights](https://noticias.uol.com.br/politica/ultimas-noticias/2020/03/28/pt-denuncia-bolsonaro-direitos-humanos.htm) or the suggestion to prosecute him at the International Criminal Court in The Hague, [contrasting sharply](https://oantagonista.com.br/brasil/quando-era-para-punir-bolsonaro-lula-conhecia-o-tribunal-internacional/) with the stance taken toward geopolitical allies. The PT’s relationship with international human rights instruments reveals a duality. While the party used these tools to advance its agenda, it questioned their validity when they challenged its interests. Dilma Rousseff’s decision to distance Brazil from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) [following criticism over the Belo Monte dam](https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/mercado/me3004201117.htm) and Lula’s stance on the International Criminal Court compared to his position on [Bolsonaro’s trial](https://pt.org.br/bolsonaro-e-acusado-em-haia-por-crime-contra-a-humanidade/) illustrate this duality. Regarding Venezuela, PT foreign policy advocates argue that bombastic or confrontational rhetoric by Itamaraty would not be productive. They claim that such postures, though domestically popular, are ineffective in diplomacy. There is merit in this view, particularly given the shifts in Brazil’s foreign policy under Michel Temer and Jair Bolsonaro. This new phase was marked by Venezuela’s isolation in regional bodies, the devaluation of mechanisms like UNASUR and CELAC, and pressure on the Venezuelan regime through fragmented regional initiatives like the Lima Group. Attempts to isolate Nicolás Maduro’s government - while the U.S. imposed sanctions and the Lima Group intensified international pressure - did not achieve the results Brazil had hoped for, limiting its ability to act as a negotiator and mediator in the regional crisis. This high-pressure approach was also criticized by Bachelet in her report, [which highlighted the adverse effects of sanctions](https://elpais.com/internacional/2021-09-15/bachelet-pide-el-levantamiento-de-sanciones-a-venezuela-porque-profundizan-la-crisis.html) on the Venezuelan population’s human rights. She emphasized that sanctions targeting Venezuela’s oil, mining, and other economic sectors violated international law, with the “maximum pressure” campaign against Venezuela breaching principles like sovereignty, equality among states, and non-intervention in internal affairs. These arguments suggest that Brazil faces a dilemma: adopting either a moralistic, strident diplomacy or a distant, strategic posture. This dichotomy points to a lack of creativity in political approaches. Both the party and the country have failed to develop more effective and consistent tactics, undermining Brazil’s ability to positively influence the Venezuelan situation and weakening its role as a promoter of democracy and human rights in the region. A reassessment and the development of new strategies are thus imperative. Brazilian foreign policy’s oscillation between complacency and selective criticism reflects not only the inherent difficulties of aligning domestic and foreign policies but also the PT’s internal contradictions. International pressure, instrumental in ending military regimes in Brazil and other Latin American countries during the 1980s and 1990s, remains essential today to address human rights crises in regions like Venezuela. The failure of Brazil’s foreign policy toward Venezuela exposes the limitations of diplomacy guided by convenience and underscores the urgent need for a new approach—one that recognizes the complexity of regional challenges and aligns with the values of peace promotion and human rights. This critical moment calls for a reevaluation of Brazilian foreign policy and presents an opportunity for Brazil to reaffirm its role as an influential and responsible actor in promoting stability and democracy in the region and beyond.