## Notes from 14 May 2025 [[2025-05-13|← Previous note]] ┃ [[2025-05-15|Next note →]] Yesterday, I attended (remotely) a thought-provoking event at the [[Institute for Government (IfG)]], titled "[Rewiring the State](https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/event/rewiring-state-government-reform)," where they presented their latest report: "[A New Civil Service Act](https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publication/new-civil-service-act)". The Institute put forward a draft Civil Service Bill designed to improve the management, functioning, and oversight of the civil service - framing it as a timely intervention in light of long-standing administrative challenges and the fresh opportunity created by the incoming Labour government, which has shown renewed urgency and alignment around the need for reform. As I listened to the discussion, I found it refreshingly clear-eyed about the challenges facing modern civil service systems. At a time when the [Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE)](https://www.doge.gov/) in the United States is dismantling parts of the American bureaucracy (an effort that will take years to repair and is, in many respects, legally questionable) there's a tendency to react by advocating for increased protection and insularity for civil servants everywhere. Many have weaponized legitimate concerns about politicization to justify ever-greater insulation of the civil service from political accountability, glorifying obstructive behavior as "democratic resistance." This Institute for Government event stood out because it focused on more fundamental questions: What is the constitutional role of the civil service in a democratic system? To whom should it be accountable? How should lines of command be organized? How can we ensure effective administration while maintaining democratic oversight? What struck me most was how the Institute's proposals echo many elements of the [Maude Review](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/review-of-governance-and-accountability/independent-review-of-governance-and-accountability-in-the-civil-service-the-rt-hon-lord-maude-of-horsham-html) - one of the most radical and interesting reform proposals in recent years. Both recognize systemic problems that impede effective governance and propose structural changes to address them. The Institute's draft bill, like the Maude review, emphasizes the need for clearer lines of accountability and a better alignment between authority and responsibility. **Beyond the politicization binary** The conventional debate about civil service reform tends to present a false binary: politicization versus bureaucratic autonomy. This framing misses the deeper constitutional paradox at the heart of civil service institutions. They must simultaneously be responsive to democratically elected governments while maintaining institutional continuity and upholding constitutional principles. This paradox cannot be resolved through simple deference or resistance, it requires sophisticated institutional design. Rather than asking whether the civil service should be more or less politicized, we should be asking how to design systems that effectively translate democratic mandates into implementation. This shifts our focus to what we could call "democratic delivery systems": institutional arrangements that ensure elected governments can implement their programs while maintaining professional standards. **The principal-agent problem at the core** At the heart of civil service accountability challenges lies what economists call the principal-agent problem. Political leaders (principals) delegate implementation to civil servants (agents) who possess specialized knowledge and information that the principals lack. This information asymmetry creates perverse incentives where civil servants may withhold critical information to maintain autonomy, while politicians lack effective monitoring mechanisms. The current system often optimizes for defensive behavior rather than outcomes. Civil servants protect themselves from potential criticism by avoiding risk, while politicians make promises without fully understanding implementation challenges. This dysfunctional dance undermines effective governance and erodes public trust. The Institute for Government's proposal attempts to address this by creating dual streams of accountability: one for policy (where permanent secretaries answer to ministers) and another for operations (where they answer to the head of the civil service). This distinction, while imperfect, provides greater clarity about who is responsible for what. **Capability as a constitutional imperative** One aspect that deserves greater emphasis is that state capability is itself a constitutional imperative. Without capable implementation, democratic choice becomes meaningless, as elected officials cannot deliver on their promises, and the public loses faith in democratic institutions. The Institute for Government recognizes this connection between [[Executive Decisiveness|executive decisiveness]] (clear lines of accountability) and human resource capacity (better salaries, training, and workforce planning). This creates a virtuous cycle: clearer accountability creates incentives for capability development, which in turn enables better delivery of democratic mandates. The current system suffers from what might be called "skills debt" - growing gaps between the capabilities needed to address complex policy challenges and the actual skills available within the civil service. This debt accumulates when governments fail to invest in long-term capability development, focusing instead on short-term political wins. **Network governance beyond ministerial silos** The Institute's proposal takes a welcome step toward clarity by recommending a distinct separation of functions currently housed within the Cabinet Office. Their vision would create two clear governance streams: one for political support and policy alignment functions (remaining with the Cabinet Secretary in a Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet) and another for civil service management and capability (led by a Head of the Civil Service in a dedicated department). However, I find their approach somewhat timid compared to the bolder vision in the Maude Review. Maude recognized with greater clarity that operational effectiveness requires the combined authority of both implementation oversight and budgetary control. His proposal to create an Office of Budget and Management that would encompass HM Treasury's public expenditure responsibilities alongside cross-cutting functions (financial management, commercial, digital, project delivery, HR) represents a more comprehensive solution. The Institute's proposal, while moving in the right direction, places too much emphasis on HR functions in isolation, without fully integrating the crucial budgetary leverage needed to drive operational excellence across departments. Without the "[power of the purse](https://substack.com/home/post/p-163080648)" behind operational mandates, cross-cutting functions may struggle to overcome departmental resistance and establish truly effective matrix management for complex policy challenges. It's no coincidence that Musk's effort to reshape the American administrative state began [precisely](https://time.com/7213990/elon-musk-doge-opm/) by [targeting](https://www.politico.com/news/2025/03/24/inside-elon-musk-and-russ-voughts-quiet-alliance-00243290) the Office of Management and Budget ([OBM](https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/)) and the Office of Personnel Management ([OPM](https://www.opm.gov/)). This strategic focus reveals a fundamental truth: controlling the flow of both money and people is the most direct path to bending government to one's will. Any serious reform of civil service governance must acknowledge this reality - which is why Maude's integrated approach combining budgetary and operational authority offers a more robust foundation for effective democratic delivery. **Porosity as democratic virtue** Perhaps most provocatively, we should consider whether the civil service should be more, rather than less, permeable to outside influence. Rather than seeing external perspectives as threats to bureaucratic autonomy, we might reframe porosity as a democratic virtue - allowing multiple channels of influence, scrutiny, and feedback to strengthen both capability and accountability. The Institute's proposal takes a step in this direction by suggesting an external _Civil Service Board_ with substantial powers to hold leadership accountable for performance and capability. This board would strengthen central management authority over Permanent Secretaries while still requiring ministerial consultation (similar to a reform Ireland [attempted in 2016](https://www.gov.ie/en/department-of-public-expenditure-ndp-delivery-and-reform/collections/accountability-board/)). This external oversight mechanism introduces a valuable form of democratic porosity beyond ministerial control. But porosity can and should take many forms. Parliamentary committees could play a more systematic role in evaluating not just what policies are implemented, but how effectively the civil service delivers them. The draft bill acknowledges this by requiring regular reporting to Parliament on civil service performance. We could go further still by designing systems that facilitate structured talent exchange with other sectors and incorporate citizen perspectives through public value measurement frameworks, and create more dynamic interfaces between the civil service and civil society organizations. These multiple channels of porosity would create a more balanced ecosystem of accountability that enhances both democratic responsiveness and professional excellence without threatening the necessary operational independence of the civil service. **Policy vs. Operations: A necessary but imperfect distinction** The distinction between "policy" (what should be done) and "operations" (how it should be done) is central to the Institute's proposal. While this distinction can bring clarity to lines of accountability, the boundary between them is often blurry and requires careful management. Policy choices inevitably shape operational possibilities, and operational constraints influence what policies are feasible. The challenge is defining these domains well enough to assign responsibility without creating artificial separations that impede effective governance. The Institute's two-stream approach (with permanent secretaries answerable to ministers for policy and to the head of civil service for operations) attempts to navigate this complexity. It recognizes both the political and technical dimensions of public administration without pretending they can be hermetically sealed from each other. This points to a deeper challenge: how do you reform a system that is responsible for implementing its own reforms? The civil service is simultaneously the object of reform and the instrument through which reform must be achieved, a paradox that helps explain why even well-designed changes often fail to stick. **Constitutional paradoxes by design** The civil service is built on enduring constitutional [paradoxes](https://nsi.org.za/publications/the-paradox-of-reform-a-response-to-the-ramaphosa-governments-proposal-for-professionalising-the-public-service/) - tensions between responsiveness and continuity, expertise and democratic control, unity and specialization, stability and innovation - that can never be fully "solved" but only managed through deliberate institutional design. The Civil Service Act proposed by the Institute for Government is a bold intervention at a time when the argument of "protecting the impartiality of the civil service" is increasingly being captured by corporatist interests. By clarifying lines of accountability, investing in capability development, and strengthening oversight, it addresses head-on the very contradictions that define democratic administration. Yet recognizing these paradoxes is only the first step. If we are to transform the civil service into a true “democratic delivery machine,” we need not only clearer rules but also more (and above all_ better_) controls: mechanisms that ensure professional competence and constitutional continuity work hand in hand with genuine public responsiveness. This means empowering citizens to hold the service to account, while equipping civil servants with the skills and incentives to innovate without sacrificing institutional memory. The debate ignited by the Institute’s proposal offers vital insights for anyone grappling with civil service reform, from Westminster to Washington, Brasília to Berlin. It reminds us that strengthening democratic governance is less a matter of technical tweaks than of reimagining how expertise, accountability, and political leadership can be woven together. In that sense, the conversation it has sparked is indispensable for thinking through civil service renewal everywhere.