## Notes from 14 June 2025 [[2025-06-13|← Previous note]] ┃ [[2025-06-15|Next note →]] ### Reading [[Peter Thomas]] on mission-led government Every time I read something by Peter Thomas (or [[Martin Stanley]]), I’m reminded of how layered and grounded UK civil service reform debates can be. There’s always attention to what actually happens inside departments - the procedural patterns, power structures, and cultural limits that shape reform efforts, regardless of how they are packaged. His [latest post](https://www.civilservicereformuk.com/single-post/the-avoidable-demise-of-mission-led-government) on the early unraveling of Starmer’s “mission-led” government was especially rich. Below, I’ve tried to organize a few personal reactions - mostly not about the concept of missions per se, but about what this piece reveals about state capability and the politics of administrative reform. #### On the idea of missions (my view) I remain ambivalent about the concept. I don’t think missions are pointless — there’s value in having society coalesce around shared priorities, and I see the appeal of a narrative that promises focus and coordination. Reading Thomas, I’m reminded how **often “missions” are just a new label for old challenges**. Governments have long tried to organize their work around a few cross-cutting priorities. In Brazil, for example, the Minas Gerais government implemented a similar system years ago. It involved projects of strategic relevance managed by "_[Empreendedores Públicos](https://repositorio.enap.gov.br/bitstream/1/3418/4/Empreendedores%20P%C3%BAblicos%20no%20Governo%20de%20Minas%20-%20Tadeu%20Barreto.pdf)_," or project leaders recruited based on merit and competence evaluations. These leaders had protected resources and a delivery unit close to the governor. So when I read about “mission controls” and “the best people in the country,” I don’t hear novelty... I hear a restatement of a pattern. That doesn’t make it wrong. But it makes me cautious about framing this as a departure, rather than a reassembly of tools we already know (planning, prioritization, delivery infrastructure) now wrapped in new fancy language. #### On budget politics and the Treasury (Thomas’s argument, which I agree with) A key insight in the piece is that **nothing moves without the Treasury**. The 2025 Spending Review could have reoriented funding around the missions. Instead, it reproduced the usual bilateral logic. That signals more than technical inertia. It shows that, institutionally, **spending authority still dominates over policy priority**. I think this reflects a broader lesson: reform agendas that don’t secure fiscal alignment tend to stall, no matter how compelling their narrative. #### On the need for coherence in reform narratives (Thomas again) Twelve months in, there’s no clear message about what kind of civil service or public sector reform this government wants. Ministers like Rayner, Miliband, and Streeting seem to have serious agendas — but these aren’t pulling in the same direction. And there’s little visible effort from No.10 to create a unifying frame. This resonates with something I’ve seen in other contexts: without consistency in the message, **people inside the system don’t know whether or how to move**. Reform needs story, and story needs alignment. #### On capability (my reaction) One part of the piece I found particularly sharp was the reflection on **what kind of capability missions require**. There’s a line that says capability is not about doing a short course at Harvard - it’s about being exposed to different ways of working. That clicked for me. I’ve seen how powerful it can be to bring outsiders into public organizations — not to displace insiders, but to widen the frame. In practice, this often means cognitive diversity: new routines, new models, new references. It also means **tension** — because insiders are protective of context, and rightly so. But some level of friction is necessary for change. Miliband’s department seems to have gotten this right: they brought in a dedicated mission lead early, worked openly, and created internal energy. But, as Thomas notes, this came from the minister — not the central government apparatus. #### A quiet but important point: the absence of strategy Thomas doesn’t say it with drama, but he says it clearly: **there is no functioning strategic brain in the UK government right now**. No unit at No.10, no empowered center, no bridge between political intent and bureaucratic follow-through. This isn’t a failure of motivation: it’s a **design problem**. That makes it hard for even the best ideas (missions or otherwise) to survive contact with the rest of the system. #### A question I’m still thinking about (my own) One thing I’m still trying to unpack is the deeper political economy of this failure. There’s a long list of structural barriers (Treasury control, ministerial accountability rules, identity politics of civil servants) but what’s striking is how few incentives there seem to be for **central coordination**. The system appears to tolerate fragmentation. It absorbs failure by labeling it “complexity.” And that, in turn, raises a more difficult question: under what conditions would any government actually invest in building the machinery that missions need?