## Notes from 29 December 2025 [[2025-12-28|← Previous note]] ┃ [[2025-12-30|Next note →]] Today I read about a controversy in Chile that caught my attention. Quick context for anyone unfamiliar: Chile has two main employment tracks in the public sector — _planta_ (permanent, statutory) and _contrata_ (fixed-term, renewable yearly). Contratas were meant for temporary needs but [became the main recruitment channel](https://www.latercera.com/pulso/noticia/norma-de-amarre-casi-el-70-de-los-funcionarios-publicos-es-a-contrata-y-mayoria-son-profesionales/) into the civil service precisely because they're a flexibility tool, easier to adjust than creating permanent posts. --- So here's what's happening: the Boric administration, on its way out (Kast takes over March 2026), is pushing through a set of rules embedded in a protocol agreement with unions tied to the annual public-sector wage adjustment. The proposals will be analyzed by Congress in an omnibus law covering a variety of topics (not only civil service stuff). The measures I'm referring to — [which some Chilean outlets are calling "amarre" in the sense of tying the hands of the next administration](https://elpais.com/chile/2025-12-27/el-gobierno-de-boric-empuja-una-norma-que-complica-el-despido-de-funcionarios-a-menos-de-tres-meses-de-que-asuma-kast.html) — would make it significantly harder to dismiss or not renew contrata staff. Instead of generic "needs of the service" justifications to not renew contrata contracts (which by design expire yearly), you'd now need a properly reasoned administrative act with objective, verifiable criteria to not renew a contrata contract after it has already been renewed for two years. Employees with accumulated time in service would have clearer paths to challenge removals on legality grounds. (How much accumulated time triggers protection has been constantly discussed in courts, with stricter interpretations gaining ground in recent years — making the Chilean civil service less and less flexible.) There's also an annex on "cabinet personnel" [formalizing rules for _asesores_](https://www.ex-ante.cl/asesores-la-otra-medida-de-amarre-que-boric-busca-dejarle-a-kast-y-que-tuvo-4-anos-para-impulsar/) (political advisers to the President, ministers, subsecretaries, heads of agencies, etc.): how they're hired, pay ceilings, staffing caps (taking clearer effect from the 2027 budget cycle), limits on holding line-management roles, post-employment restrictions, and transparency obligations including mandatory reporting of adviser rosters within specified deadlines. Adviser tenure would be explicitly linked to the authority they serve. There's a kind of transversal agreement in Chile that there should be more regulation and transparency around the number and payment of advisers — but the government's proposal doesn't come out of consultation with Congress in the context of a proper administrative reform or modernization effort. Legislative discussion about both topics — expanded job security for contratas and limitations on the governance of advisers — was signaled to start in early January 2026, just weeks before the transition. --- The political economy here is textbook, really. Outgoing governments have incentives to protect their people; incoming governments want flexibility to reshape teams. No value judgment — it's just what happens, especially when the transition is between administrations of different political signs. What I find a bit irresponsible is the timing and vehicle. This is being pushed through at the tail end of the mandate, attached to a wage-adjustment negotiation rather than a proper administrative reform. Yes, they argue it's the fruit of collective bargaining with unions. But still — it's a partial rewiring of the politics/administration relationship in Chile, reducing managerial flexibility without equivalent advances in accountability or performance evaluation mechanisms. And there's another layer here: the two-year threshold for expanded contrata protections would benefit many staff hired under Boric. The merit filter for contratas was always weaker on entry precisely because they could be let go more easily — flexibility on the back end compensated for looser selection on the front end. Tightening dismissals without tightening entry standards changes that bargain. And given that Kast has been talking about implementing workforce adjustments in the Chilean civil service, it's hard not to read this as an [attempt to lock in Boric-era hires](https://horizontalchile.cl/actualidad/casi-33-mil-funcionarios-que-ingresaron-en-el-actual-gobierno-se-verian-beneficiados-por-polemico-amarre-revisa-el-detalle/) before the transition. [Felipe Melo Rivara appears to be a key architect of this approach](https://www.ex-ante.cl/felipe-melo-jefe-del-segundo-piso-de-boric-y-principal-defensor-de-cuestionadas-politicas-de-amarre/). He's a former director of Chile's Servicio Civil and the Consejo de Alta Dirección Pública, very close to Boric, and politically rooted in the student movement that gave rise to several leaders in the current administration. He's associated with the legalistic framing around "confianza legítima" (legitimate expectation) to expand contrata job security. --- Worth noting: this isn't just opposition vs. government. [Parts of Boric's own coalition are pushing back](https://www.ex-ante.cl/como-el-proyecto-de-amarre-de-funcionarios-publicos-dividio-al-oficialismo/) on the timing and method. The underlying tension feels familiar: more stability and procedural constraints, but without the counterweights that would make this a balanced reform. If you're going to increase rigidity, you need to compensate with institutional agility elsewhere — streamlined performance evaluations that can actually lead to dismissals for poor performance, special employment categories that are easier to hire and fire, clearer boundaries between career and political roles. Just making it harder to let people go, without any of that, shifts the civil service equilibrium toward rigidity in a way that feels incomplete at best.